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Book Reviews
Judith Evans Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Antiquity: The Emperor Constantine's Marriage Legislation, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp.
X+ 390. $60.00 (ISBN 0-19-814768-6).
Julian the Apostate described Constantine as "an innovator, and an overturner of
ancient laws" (Ammianus Marcellinus 21.1 0.8). Even had he not done so, scholars would have had no difficulty in concluding that the first Christian emperor had
a pivotal role in the shaping of Roman law. The legislation of Constantine is abundant, largely because Theodosius II chose it as the starting point for his Codex
Theodosianus, which provides an unparalleled series of formal pronouncements,
both edicts and epistles, on matters of law. But, as Evans Grubbs shows in this
impressive and important book, Constantine's legislation has to be seen in context,
not least in the matter of marriage, divorce, and the role of women in society.
At the core of the book are specific texts from the Theodosian Code, in which
Constantine made decisions about key areas of the Roman law of marriage: he
abolished Augustus's famous penalties on celibacy, he formalized certain practices connected with betrothal, he specified strict penalties for the crime of forcible
abduction and marriage (raptus) , he increased the penalties for marriage and cohabitation by women and slaves, and he made it more difficult for a marriage to
be dissolved unilaterally. All of these measures have been seen, by one scholar or
another, as instances of Constantine's Christianity in action. But Evans Grubbs concludes that Christianity is likely to have been a major factor only in the case of
the law on divorce; she argues convincingly that most of the Constantinian innovation in the area of marriage was prompted not by religious ideology but by pressures from society as a whole.
Arriving at these conclusions is a significant achievement. The author places
Constantine's legal decisions in their legal, social, and religious contexts, and displays both subtlety and impressive learning in the process. It is maddeningly difficult to make useful generalizations about such matters as religion and sexuality,
especially for the ancient world, where almost any firm statement demands an
immediate qualification. Evans Grubbs is an alert and judicious guide through such
issues as whether or not pagan Romans tolerated sexual license (not as much as
our focus on pagan elites tends to suggest) and whether a Christian suspicion of
sexuality was imposed on Roman society or derived from it (probably the latter,
though the intense focus on sexual matters in Christianity owes much to the church
hierarchy). This summary of the argument cannot do it justice, of course; in pursuing her questions about Constantine the author has produced an important analysis of some of the key questions raised by the rise of Christianity and its relationship to Roman society.
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Although her main focus is on family history and the impact of Christianity,
Evans Grubbs also raises important issues of Roman law. Ludwig Mitteis suggested
long ago (Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den ostlichen Provinzen des romischen
Kaiserreichs [1891; rpt. Hildesheim, 1963]) that as a legislator Constantine was
particularly open to what he called Volksrecht, the legal conceptions of the peoples of Rome's eastern provinces. In West Roman Vulgar Law: The Law of Property (Philadelphia, 1951; idem, Westromisches Vulgarrecht: Das Obligationenrecht
[Weimar, 1956]), on the other hand, Ernest Levy argued that Constantine's distinctive contribution as a legislator was to incorporate "popular" but western legal
concepts, the so-called "vulgar law." These categories are obviously rough-andready ones, and they are probably ideologically somewhat suspect nowadays as
well. But the legal issues are real enough, and Evans Grubbs is right to confront
them. She argues that Constantine's innovations in the law of marriage can be seen
as part of what Levy saw as the rise of "vulgar law." Constantine, in other words,
modified the law on marriage in response to the real-life experiences of "ordinary"
citizens, being more willing than his predecessors to abandon the traditional principles of a Roman law that was out of touch with reality. Thus, though Julian may
have been right that Constantine overturned the laws, he was far, the author concludes, from overturning custom.
My one reservation about this analysis is that the society pressures on Constantine's legislation perhaps require further investigation. Evans Grubbs is unwilling
to accept the suggestion, made by Mitteis and others, that some of the pressure for
change came from Roman citizens who were operating with "eastern" legal assumptions. One of the most compelling examples of this is the adoption by Roman law of a sort of male counterpart to the dowry, the arrha sponsalica. The traditional Roman law treated gifts from a prospective husband to his bride as simply
that: gifts made of the groom's own free will and not recoverable in law should
the marriage not take place. But in the Greek world such gifts were connected
inextricably with the promise of marriage, and from the fourth century on Roman
law came to recognize a right of recovery. The question of the precise ethnicity of
the concept is a vexed one; arrha is a form of the Greek word arrabon, which
though certainly a Semitic word (compare Hebrew erabon), appears in Greek texts
as early as the fourth century B.c. Whatever its origin, the arrha was clearly a fundamental part of the Greek conception of marriage: in the Byzantine legal texts it
is seen as a formal part of getting engaged, and indeed the word is actually used
as a synonym for "betrothal." The hybrid term arrha sponsalica does not appear
in Roman legal sources until 380, but Constantine decided in a law of 319 that under
certain circumstances gifts intended as part of the betrothal should be returned (Cth.
3.5.2). Evans Grubbs argues that eastern influence is unlikely, in part because
Constantine in 319 was emperor only of the western half of the empire. I would
suggest, instead, that the question of eastern influence is a more complicated one
than this; there is no reason why "vulgar law" should not have contained elements
of "Volksrecht." The Roman empire, as Evans Grubbs so admirably shows, was
an extremely complicated place.
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